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Over the past ﬁfteen years, U.S. households in the
aggregate have devoted an increasing share of their
after-tax income to the payment of ﬁnancial obliga-
tions. Much of the increase is attributable to a rise
in the level of credit card debt, which has raised the
share of households’ aggregate after-tax income that
is devoted to credit card payments. In turn, the rising
share of credit card debt in overall ﬁnancial obliga-
tions may stem from several notable changes in the
credit card market over this period.
Financial obligations such as credit card debt and
housing costs require monthly payments whose level
relative to income is, of course, a vital concern to the
individual household. A household’s choice to take
on obligations that increase these payments may rep-
resent an accurate assessment by the household of
its ability to make payments on its obligations. How-
ever, devoting more income to required debt pay-
ments and other obligations will make the household
more likely to default in the event of job loss or
illness.
Likewise, an aggregate measure of payments on
household ﬁnancial obligations relative to income
is of interest to economic policy makers because of
potential concerns about the vulnerability of the
household sector as a whole. In 1980, the Federal
Reserve Board began calculating and tracking the
ratio of households’ aggregate required monthly pay-
ments on mortgage and consumer debt to their aggre-
gate after-tax (that is, disposable) income, a measure
called the debt service ratio (DSR). To gain a broader
picture of households’ ﬁnancial position, the Federal
Reserve Board in 2003 introduced a new measure,
called the ﬁnancial obligations ratio (FOR).1 The new
measure added other types of obligations to those of
the DSR, namely payments on auto leases and hous-
ing expenses for rent, homeowner’s insurance, and
real estate taxes. As with the DSR, the obligations in
the FOR are presented as a share of aggregate, after-
tax income.
For a given level of aggregate income, no clear line
separates an appropriate level of payments on ﬁnan-
cial obligations from an excessive one, but the cur-
rent level of the FOR is elevated relative to historical
experience. It stood at 181⁄3 percent in the second
quarter of 2005, a level noticeably above its value
ﬁfteen years earlier (chart 1). Of the major compo-
nents of the FOR, the ratio of credit card payments
to disposable income rose the most over this period.
Mortgage payments also rose signiﬁcantly as a share
of income, but payments on other types of debt
obligations fell (chart 2).
This article argues that three important develop-
ments in the credit card market over the past ﬁfteen
years account for most of the rise in credit card
payments relative to income. First, improvements
in credit-scoring technology and the advent of risk-
based pricing of credit card debt have increased
the share of households—particularly lower-income
households—with a credit card. Second, in the 1990s,
credit card interest rates began to vary with changes
1. For a discussion of the DSR and FOR, see Dynan, Johnson, and
Pence (2003).








2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980
NOTE: The data are quarterly. Shaded bars are periods of recession as
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The FOR consists of
the aggregate required monthly payments of the household sector on con-
sumer debt, mortgages, homeowner’s insurance, real estate taxes, rent, and
auto leases as a percent of aggregate after-tax personal income. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
housedebt). in broader market interest rates. In turn, this
co-movement led to an especially pronounced decline
in credit card interest rates when, beginning in 2001,
market rates turned sharply lower; the decline in
credit card rates raised the demand for credit card
debt. Finally, households have increased their use of
credit cards as a convenient means of paying for daily
purchases.
The article estimates the quantitative effect of each
of these three developments on the revolving con-
sumer (that is, nonmortgage) credit portion of the
FOR—the ratio of required minimum payments on
revolving consumer credit relative to disposable
income.2 The analysis indicates that these three de-
velopments in the credit card market together
accounted for most of the rise of the revolving credit
FOR and played a strong role in the rise of the total
FOR.
In a concluding section, the article considers these
ﬁndings in relation to the possible economic impli-
cations of the rise in the revolving credit FOR. For
example, a rise in required credit card payments
stemming from a greater use of credit cards to pay for
day-to-day purchases may not signal greater ﬁnan-
cial vulnerability if households are willing and able
to pay off these card charges each month. In addi-
tion, the rise in payments associated with the increase
in credit availability due to credit scoring may be
accompanied by some beneﬁts: More widespread
access to credit may help more households maintain
their consumption during temporary income disrup-
tions and in turn contribute to the stability of the
macroeconomy.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CREDIT CARD MARKET
Three developments in the credit card market likely
accounted for much of the rise in household ﬁnancial
obligations over the past ﬁfteen years: an expansion
in the prevalence of credit cards among lower-income
households, the widespread adoption of variable-rate
cards, and a greater willingness of households to use
their credit cards for day-to-day purchases of goods
and services. The available data—from the Federal
Reserve Board’s triennial Survey of Consumer
Finances—allow a comprehensive analysis of the
importance of each development for the period. The
survey conducted nearest the beginning of the ﬁfteen-
year period was in 1989, and the survey for which the
most recent data are available was conducted in 2001.
The Expansion of the Credit Card Market
More and more households have gained access to
credit cards over the past decade and a half. The
share of households with at least one credit card rose
from 70 percent in 1989 to 76 percent in 2001
(table 1). Determining which group of cardholders in
2001 would not have been cardholders in 1989 will
help us estimate the effect that the expansion in
cardholding had on household ﬁnancial obligations.
Broadly speaking, an expansion of cardholding could
arise through two channels. First, changes in supply
or demand conditions in the credit card market, hold-
ing the characteristics of households ﬁxed, could
increase the share of households with credit cards.
Such developments may include changes in credit
card underwriting standards or a general increase in
households’ desire for credit cards. Second, changes
in household characteristics may increase the percent-
age of households who qualify for a credit card under
a given set of underwriting standards.
The analysis presented below suggests that much
if not most of the rise in cardholding over the 1989–
2001 period came from an expansion of supply to
riskier households—those that would not have quali-
2. A credit card account is a type of consumer (that is, nonmort-
gage) revolving credit. Generally, revolving credit extensions can be
made at the customer’s discretion, provided that they do not cause the
outstanding balance of the account to exceed a prearranged credit
limit. Revolving credit repayments are also at the customer’s discre-
tion, subject to a prearranged minimum, and may be made in one or
more installments. More than 90 percent of consumer revolving debt
is credit card debt.
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NOTE: The data are quarterly. For a description of consumer revolving
credit, see text note 2. Nonrevolving debt consists of credit accounts that
terminate when the balances are paid off; such accounts include loans for
motor vehicles, household goods, and education. Data shown for each type of
debt are the aggregate required monthly payments for that type as a percent of
aggregate after-tax income. See also note to chart 1. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board. 
474 Federal Reserve Bulletin Autumn 2005ﬁed for a card in 1989. In the mid-1990s, card issuers
began ranking applicants according to their probabil-
ity of default; instead of denying cards to all those
who posed too great a risk for a given interest rate
on the card, they began issuing cards to some of the
higher-risk applicants and set the interest rate on
these riskier accounts high enough to compensate the
lenders for the greater risk (Edelberg, 2003). The
practice of issuing cards to higher-risk household was
a signiﬁcant change in the supply conditions in the
credit card market.
Credit Scoring and Risk-Based Pricing
Lenders can rank applicants according to their likeli-
hood of default through a measure called a credit
score, which aggregates the factors in a potential
borrower’s credit history that are associated with a
willingness and ability to pay. The higher the credit
score, the more likely is the applicant to pay as
agreed on a new credit account. The adoption of
ﬂexible, or risk-based, pricing allows creditors to
issue cards to less-qualiﬁed applicants in exchange
for a higher interest rate on the card. Credit scoring
was considered by providers of consumer credit as
early as the late 1930s, but the practice did not
become widespread until the 1990s, when computers
capable of processing large amounts of data became
widely used (McCorkell, 2002).
Risk-based pricing has increased the availability of
credit cards for all households, but its effect has been
the greatest among riskier households. In particular,
the rate of cardholding among households in the
lowest quintile of the income distribution rose about
half, from 29 percent to 43 percent, between 1989
and 2001 (table 1), whereas the rate of cardholding
rose only 10 percent in the general population, from
70 percent to 76 percent. Among households in the
lowest income decile (not shown in the table), the
rate of cardholding about doubled over the period,
from 18 percent to 35 percent. The rate among house-
holds who reported having been previously denied
credit also rose more than did the overall rate.
These patterns are consistent with an expansion
of cardholding through the ﬁrst channel—in this case,
a higher supply of cards through the use of credit
scoring. The possibility remains, however, that the
increase in cardholding may have also arisen, at least
in part, through the second channel—that is, the
characteristics of these new cardholders may have
improved over the period. For example, they may
have demonstrated a better employment history or a
better record of paying rent and utility bills; in this
case, a rise in creditworthiness could have produced
more widespread cardholding among lower-income
households rather than a change in underwriting stan-
dards. We can sort out the relative inﬂuence of the
two channels with a statistical model.
Who Are the New Cardholders?
I apply a statistical model to data from the Federal
Reserve Board’s triennial Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF). Each SCF obtains detailed demo-
graphic and ﬁnancial information from a statistically
representative national sample of approximately
3,000 households. The model used here links the
characteristics of households in the survey to the
probability that they hold at least one credit card.
The characteristics used to predict cardholding
were income, wealth, number of children, the age of
the household head, and indicators for the sex, mari-
tal status, and education of the household head.3 The
predictors also included an indicator for whether a
3. See Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003) for a presentation
of results of the 2001 SCF (the most recent survey for which data
are available); see p. 30 of that work for a deﬁnition of the terms
household and head of household used here. The types of cards
considered in the surveys include bank-issued cards, store cards and
charge accounts, gasoline company cards, and so-called travel and
entertainment cards such as American Express and Diners’ Club
(p. 24, note 27).
1. Proportion of households with at least one credit card, by income quintile, selected years, 1989–2001
Percent
Income quintile 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 Percent increase,
1989–20011
All ................................ 69.5 71.9 74.4 72.7 76.3 9.8
Lowest ............................ 29.3 33.0 38.2 34.7 42.9 46.5
Second lowest ..................... 57.1 66.9 63.9 64.4 67.4 18.1
Middle ............................ 75.9 74.2 78.3 77.7 82.1 8.3
Second highest ..................... 87.1 88.8 91.5 88.5 88.5 1.7
Highest ............................ 95.5 94.6 98.0 96.6 97.1 1.7
Note: For types of credit cards considered and deﬁnition of concepts of
household and head of household used in the tables, see text note 3.
1. Computed from unrounded data.
Source: Here and in the following tables, Federal Reserve Board’s
Survey of Consumer Finances and author’s calculations.
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payments in the past year (table 2).
These characteristics differ signiﬁcantly between
those households with credit cards and those without
and thus serve as good predictors of cardholding. For
example, in the 1989 SCF, households that held credit
cards had signiﬁcantly higher wealth and income
than non-cardholders (table 2, ﬁrst and second col-
umns). In addition, the heads of cardholding house-
holds were more often college-educated, married, or
male. Finally, cardholding households were less
likely to have been behind on a loan payment in the
preceding year.
The statistical model can focus on the effect that
each characteristic has on the probability of cardhold-
ing by keeping the other characteristics constant.4
Estimates suggest that all the selected characteristics
except the age and marital status of the household
head had a large and statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the probability that a household held a credit card
in 1989.
The model can also shed light on the extent to
which changes in supply factors (lenders’ willingness
to issue a card to a given household) and demand
factors (a given household’s interest in holding one)
together contributed to the rise in cardholding
between 1989 and 2001.5 Any portion of the rise in
credit card availability not attributable to supply and
demand factors may be attributable to changes in the
ﬁnancial characteristics that have increased the credit-
worthiness of households.
To separate these effects, I estimated the model
ﬁrst with data from the 1989 SCF and then with data
from the 2001 SCF. Using the two sets of estimates
and the characteristics of households in the two years,
I ﬁrst calculated the overall change in the estimated
probability of cardholding between 1989 and 2001
(table 3, ﬁrst column). To isolate the effect of changes
in supply and demand conditions between these
years, I calculated a hypothetical probability of card-
holding in 2001 based on the 1989 household charac-
teristics and the 2001 estimation results. In other
words, I predicted which households in 2001 would
have been holding cards if there had been no changes
in the characteristics of households since 1989. The
difference between this hypothetical probability for
2001 and the estimated probability for 1989 corre-
sponds to the effect of changes in supply and demand
conditions from 1989 to 2001 (table 3, second col-
umn). The part of the overall change in the estimated
probability not explained by changes in supply and
demand is that associated with changes in household
characteristics (table 3, third column).
For the general population, the results imply that
changes in supply and demand conditions account
for only 2 percentage points of a 7 percentage point
overall rise in the estimated probability of cardhold-
ing. But, in the lowest quintile of income, where the
estimated probability of cardholding rose far more
than the average, more than half of the effect—9 of
the 16 percentage points of gain in the probability—is
attributable to supply and demand factors. Although
the model cannot distinguish changes in supply from
changes in demand, the result is certainly consistent
with an increase in the supply of credit cards for the
lowest-income households (see also Bostic, 2002).
4. This technique, called a probit model, has been used by Klee
(2004) and Duca and Whitesell (1995). The model does a fairly
accurate job of predicting whether each household in the 1989 data set
held a credit card. It correctly predicts actual cardholding for 91 per-
cent of households with at least one card and 56 percent of households
with no card, for an overall correct prediction rate of 81 percent.
5. The model cannot identify supply factors separately from
demand factors.
2. Selected characteristics of households, by whether they
hold a credit card, 1989








Income (thousands of dollars) ... 63.2 20.0
Wealth (thousands of dollars) .... 315.9 60.4
Number of children ............. .7 .8
Recently delinquent1 ............ 3.3 10.0
Head of household ..............
Age (years) .................. 48.4 46.9
No high school degree ........ 15.7 44.4
College degree ............... 36.5 8.1
Married ...................... 64.0 35.0
Male ......................... 77.3 59.2
1. Delinquent sixty days or more in the past year.
3. Change in the estimated probability that a household
holds a credit card, and source of change, by income
quintile, selected years, 1989–2001
Percent except as noted










All ....................... 72 5
Lowest ................... 16 9 7
Second lowest ............ 10 4 6
Middle ................... 7 1 6
Second highest ............ 3 −14
Highest ................... 0 −22
Note: For details, see text.
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households in each survey who acquired cards most
recently. Such households are termed here as ‘‘new
cardholders’’ and are deﬁned as those households
with the lowest estimated probability of holding a
credit card. An examination of changes in the charac-
teristics of new cardholders over time also suggests
an increase in the supply of credit cards to riskier
households (table 4). New cardholders in surveys
after 1989 are more likely to have been delinquent on
a loan in the preceding six months and are also
younger and have more children; these patterns sug-
gest that new cardholders now are likely less credit-
worthy than those in the past. Work by other
researchers, who examined the 1989–95 period, cor-
roborates the view that the average cardholder has
become riskier over that period—the average card-
holder had less job seniority, had lower income, had
lower liquid assets, was more willing to use debt to
ﬁnance consumption (an attitude considered to be a
‘‘riskier’’ view of credit), and was more likely to be
single and be a renter (Black and Morgan, 1998).
The credit card debt taken on by these new card-
holders probably raises the ratio of aggregate mea-
sured revolving credit payments to aggregate income.
The effect on the overall FOR may be damped,
however, if these households substituted credit card
debt for other measured forms of credit, such as
personal loans and installment loans. But given that
access to these forms of credit for these new card-
holders was likely limited in the past, substitution
(to the degree it occurred) was probably out of
unmeasured forms of debt. For example, in a survey
of households in low- and moderate-income areas of
Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, 53 percent
of respondents said they would rely on friends or
family to borrow $500 for three months, and 15 per-
cent said they had obtained ﬁnancing from institu-
tions not captured by aggregate statistics, such as
pawn shops, payday lenders, and rent-to-own
establishments.6
Closer Relation of Credit Card Interest Rates
to Broader Market Rates
The second important development in the credit card
market is the closer relation of credit card interest
rates to broader market rates. In particular, this devel-
opment allowed credit card interest rates to move
down when market rates began to fall in 2001, which
in turn signiﬁcantly boosted the demand for credit
card debt and the payments required to service this
debt.
One might expect credit card interest rates to vary
with the cost of funds, given the important role of
these costs in lenders’ credit card expenses.7 But, in
the 1980s and early 1990s, credit card interest rates
changed little, showing a correlation with the prime
rate (a good measure of the cost of funds) of only
about 0.09 (see box ‘‘Theories of Credit Card Interest
Rate ‘Stickiness’’’ for a discussion of some possible
reasons for this early unresponsiveness). The correla-
tion subsequently rose sharply, and it has averaged
0.90 during the past ten years. Notably, the average
credit card interest rate in real terms (that is, adjusted
for inﬂation) declined in tandem with the real prime
rate from the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 to the second
quarter of 2004, when the real prime rate hit its most
recent low (chart 3).
The rapid growth of variable-rate cards since 1989
materially contributed to the increase in the ﬂexibility
in interest rates on credit cards. A variable-rate credit
card carries an interest rate that maintains a con-
stant margin, or spread, over a stated market refer-
ence rate such as the prime rate or the LIBOR (the
London interbank offered rate). In 1989, variable-rate
credit cards accounted for only about 3 percent of
credit card accounts. By 1994, this share had grown
6. Siedman, Hababou, and Kramer (2005). Rent-to-own establish-
ments offer consumers the option to acquire the ownership of mer-
chandise by renting it for a speciﬁed period of time.
7. One industry source found that the cost of funds accounted for
43 percent of the cost of credit extended through credit cards between
1990 and 1993 (Credit Card News, May issue of various years).
4. Financial and demographic characteristics of existing
and new cardholders, selected years, 1992–2001
Percent except as noted
Cardholder and characteristic 1992 1995 1998 2001
Estimated existing cardholders
Income (thousands of dollars) ... 56.8 61.4 69.7 85.3
Wealth (thousands of dollars) .... 288.5 318.9 394.4 532.2
Number of children ............. .7 .7 .7 .7
Recently delinquent1 ............ 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.0
Head of household
Age (years) .................. 48.7 48.7 49.3 49.7
No high school degree ........ 10.0 9.0 7.0 6.0
College degree ............... 42.0 40.0 44.0 45.0
Married ...................... 64.0 62.0 62.0 63.0
Male ......................... 78.0 78.0 78.0 79.0
Estimated new cardholders
Income (thousands of dollars) ... 8.6 11.4 12.5 16.0
Wealth (thousands of dollars) .... 21.0 24.2 7.7 24.2
Number of children ............. .7 .7 1.2 1.0
Recently delinquent1 ............ 9.0 13.0 24.0 19.0
Head of household
Age (years) .................. 50.8 52.1 44.6 46.1
No high school degree ........ 54.0 53.0 51.0 43.0
College degree ............... .3 5.0 6.0 2.0
Married ...................... 19.0 24.0 16.0 21.0
Male ......................... 63.0 54.0 66.0 61.0
Note: For calculation of existing and new cardholders, see text.
1. Delinquent sixty days or more in the past year.
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75 percent.8
A key to the lender’s choice of variable-rate versus
ﬁxed-rate pricing lies in the behavior of cardholders
who are the most proﬁtable to card issuers.9 In gen-
eral, the most proﬁtable cardholders are those who
carry large amounts of debt on their cards because
they pay more interest than other cardholders
(although this beneﬁt is offset by the fact that some
high-debt cardholders may have a higher likelihood
of default). Several factors have increased the odds
that proﬁtable cardholders will switch to lower-rate
cards; these factors have thus increased the incentive
for lenders to lower credit card interest rates when
their cost of funds allows it.
The ﬁrst of these factors is that households may
have become better able to predict how much credit
card debt they will carry from month to month in the
future and how much in interest costs they will incur.
According to recent research, most consumers who
were presented with a choice between two credit card
contracts chose the contract that was optimal given
their actual future borrowing.10 This realistic assess-
ment by cardholders of their borrowing needs implies
that a large proportion of borrowers who carry debt
will respond to an offer of a card with a lower rate.
A second reason that consumers with relatively
large amounts of credit card debt may be more
responsive to changes in credit card interest rates is
that the cost of searching for a lower-rate card has
declined. For example, a dramatic increase in adver-
tising by credit card companies may have made it
easier to compare rates across cards. The number of
credit card solicitations jumped from about ten per
U.S. household in 1992 to more than forty in 2004.11
In addition, the Internet has become a potent source
of information about credit card terms; a recent on-
line search of the term ‘‘compare credit card interest
rates’’ yielded about 1,000 results. Changes in federal
law have probably also made it easier for households
to compare credit card terms. In 1988, the Congress
amended the Truth in Lending Act to require that all
credit card solicitations include information about the
annual percentage rate, annual fee, minimum ﬁnance
charge, transaction charge, grace period, balance
computation method, cash advance fee, late payment
fee, over-the-limit fee, and balance transfer fee.12
Lastly, credit card lenders have invested in infor-
mation technology that allows them to better identify
the least risky households with high levels of credit
card debt. As a result, lenders can make offers to only
those high-debt consumers who are expected to be
proﬁtable. Thus, although consumers with high levels
of credit card debt are more likely than others to be
turned down for a credit card, the gap in probabilities
is narrowing.13 All told, these developments have
likely increased the share of switching done by prof-
itable households with high levels of credit card debt
and in turn increased the incentive for lenders to
adjust credit card interest rates.
Credit Cards as a Payment Method
A third important development in the credit card
market is an increase in the transactions demand for
credit cards. Such demand harks back to the purpose
8. Stango (2000) and author’s calculations.
9. The greater prevalence of variable-rate cards can also be
explained by an increase in market concentration (see Stango, 2000),
and, indeed, the ten largest card issuers doubled their market share
from 40 percent in 1989 to about 80 percent in 2004.
10. Agarwal and others (2005); the data in that work cannot
demonstrate a change from the early to late 1990s in households’
ability to assess their borrowing needs
11. http://core.synovate.com/mailvol.asp; and www.census.gov/
population/www/index.html (under ‘‘Population Data by Subject’’
select ‘‘Families’’ and then scroll to ‘‘Table HH-1’’).
12. Even with a decline in search costs, credit card interest rates
may remain sticky if proﬁtable, high-debt consumers remain less
likely to search than other households. Analyses of SCF data by
Calem and Mester (1995) do show a negative relationship between
high credit card debt and willingness to shop for better credit card
terms; however, work by Calem, Gordy, and Mester (2005), Crook
(2002), and the present author indicate that the relationship has
weakened since then.
13. This assertion is based on an analysis of 1989 and 2001 SCF
data by the present author that builds on work by Calem and Mester
(1995).
3. Average real credit card interest rate and  
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478 Federal Reserve Bulletin Autumn 2005of the original third-party charge card, which was
issued in 1950 by Diners’ Club for use in restaurants
(Evans and Schmalensee, 2005, p. 4). Charges had
to paid in full each month, so the card represented
only a convenient payment method rather than a way
to obtain longer-term ﬁnancing. American Express
cards were launched in 1958, also as transaction
cards, but Bank of America followed in the same
year with the ﬁrst general-purpose credit card on
which only a portion of the balance needed to be paid
each month.
Over time, many ﬁnancial institutions began offer-
ing cards that offered the option of paying only a
portion of the balance each month. Although the
long-term-loan component of credit card debt came
to exceed the transactions component, the transac-
tions demand for credit cards has nonetheless contin-
ued to grow. For transactions, credit cards have sev-
eral advantages over cash. First, unlike cash, a credit
card may offer consumers protection when it is lost
or stolen. Second, credit cards permit households to
earn interest on their funds during the period between
the transaction and the payment of the credit card bill
(the interest earned in this way is known as ‘‘ﬂoat’’).
Indeed, researchers have found that households with
credit cards tend to have lower balances in their
transactions accounts than do households without
credit cards, which suggests that households may be
holding funds in accounts that offer higher yields
until they need to pay off their credit cards.14 Credit
cards also offer the consumer an advantage over
checks in that it is faster to swipe a card through a
terminal than to write a check.
In more recent years, transactions demand for
credit cards has been spurred by card issuers that
have responded to increasingly intense competition
by offering rewards for heavy credit card use. Such
rewards include cash-back rebates on purchases, dis-
counts on merchandise, and ‘‘mileage’’ programs that
cover travel expenses. These programs, which add to
14. See, for example, Duca and Whitesell (1995), White (1976),
and Mandell (1972). Transactions accounts are checking, savings, and
money market accounts as well as cash accounts at brokerages.
Theories of Credit Card Interest Rate ‘‘Stickiness’’
Credit card interest rates did not respond to changes in
the cost of funds before the mid-1990s. The causes of this
interest rate ‘‘stickiness’’ have been debated in the econom-
ics literature. Many authors have asserted that when the cost
of funds declined, credit card lenders did not reduce their
interest rates because doing so seemed likely to attract
borrowers who were less proﬁtable.1
One theory posited the existence of three types of credit
card consumer to explain why only less proﬁtable consum-
ers were likely to switch to cards with lower interest rates
(Ausubel, 1991). The ﬁrst type used a credit card only to
transact (make day-day-purchases) and did not carry a
balance. The second type used a card to borrow and planned
to carry a balance. The third type did not plan on borrowing
for the long term but ultimately was likely to carry a
balance. The ﬁrst and third types would not switch cards
when a lower interest rate alternative was presented because
they did not think they would borrow and pay interest; only
consumers who knew they would borrow would decide to
switch. If those who planned to carry a balance are less
proﬁtable than other consumers (perhaps because they have
higher default rates) ﬁrms would be reluctant to reduce their
interest rates.
Another theory explained sticky interest rates by assert-
ing that the most proﬁtable customers had higher costs both
1. Because they were written at a time when general market rates were
declining, these papers do not address the causes of upward stickiness, that
is, the reasons why credit card interest rates did not rise with general market
rates.
of searching for a new card and of switching to that card
(Calem and Mester, 1995). In this argument, consumers
with high amounts of debt were the most proﬁtable for the
credit card lenders.2 But these consumers were also the least
likely to search for a card with a lower interest rate because
they were more impatient (which is why they borrowed so
much) and because they were more likely to be turned
down for a new card owing to their high debt. All told,
these factors implied that a ﬁrm that lowered its rates would
have its pool of borrowers shift toward less proﬁtable ones
(those with less debt) because they were the most likely to
switch to a lower-rate card.
A third theory asserted that credit card interest rates
appeared sticky because borrowers switched from credit
cards to other forms of ﬁnancing when the cost of funds
declined (Brito and Hartley, 1995). In response to the loss
of borrowers, credit card lenders lent to riskier households
and charged them higher interest rates to compensate for
their higher probability of default. This change in the com-
position of credit card borrowers offset the effect of a lower
cost of funds; thus, credit card interest rates did not decline
with the cost of funds.
2. This assertion is plausible: According to Credit Card News (May issue,
various years) interest charges on borrowing accounted for an average of
73 percent of the revenue of credit card lenders between 1990 and 1993.
However, some portion of the proﬁts from interest charges levied on high-
debt consumers would be offset by their greater propensity to default.
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transactions use of cards because they generally do
not require the cardholder to carry the balance from
month to month to receive the rewards.15
Transactions demand has also grown because
opportunities for credit card transactions have risen
in the past decade.16 According to the Census Bureau,
sales over the Internet and by mail order have
increased considerably in recent years, and credit
cards likely are used for many of these transactions.
Sales in these categories have increased close to
15 percent per year since 1999, the ﬁrst year for
which e-commerce data were collected.17 Even tradi-
tional brick-and-mortar stores have increased their
acceptance of credit cards. In 1989, about 23⁄4 million
merchants accepted Visa cards; by 2000, that number
had reached 41⁄4 million.18
Increased transactions demand raises the aggregate
level of credit card debt outstanding as currently
measured. Suppose, for example, that a consumer
charges $500 on the ﬁfteenth day of one month and
pays it off on the ﬁfteenth day of the next month.
Aggregate credit is measured as the stock of debt
at the end of each month, so the measured estimates
will capture the $500 owed at the end of the month in
which the charge was made. Thus, measured aggre-
gate credit includes debt that will be paid off in the
next month (transactions demand) as well as debt that
will be paid off over a longer period. If transactions
demand rises more rapidly than the demand for
longer-term debt, then measured aggregate debt will
also grow faster than the demand for debt.
According to recent research, transactions demand
as a share of measured revolving debt rose from
about 6 percent in 1992 to 11 percent in 2001
(Johnson, 2004). That analysis also suggests that the
growth in transactions demand was particularly rapid
in the latter part of the 1990s. Had transactions
demand remained constant from 1992 to 2001, the
growth of measured credit card debt during that
period would have been slower by about 1 percentage
point per year, and the level of credit card debt in
2001 would have been 71⁄2 percent lower than it
actually was. These results are roughly consistent
with data suggesting that transactions demand
accounted for about 10 percent of measured credit
card debt over the past decade and a half.19
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CREDIT CARD MARKET
AND THE REVOLVING CREDIT FOR
The 11⁄4 percentage point rise in the revolving con-
sumer credit portion of the ﬁnancial obligations ratio
over the past decade and half is almost as large as the
rise in the total FOR over that period.20 How much of
the increase in the revolving credit FOR is attribut-
able to the developments in the credit card market
discussed above? One can estimate the contribution
by comparing actual ﬁnancial obligations with those
associated with ‘‘counterfactual’’ scenarios in which
the effect of changes in the credit card market are
removed from the data. The following sections
present a counterfactual scenario for each of the three
credit card market developments and one for all three
together.
The Effect of the Increase in Cardholding
The effect of new cardholders on the revolving credit
FOR can be estimated by calculating the ratio under
the counterfactual scenario in which the proportion of
households holding at least one card remained at its
15. Card issuers can beneﬁt from an increase in transactions
demand because they receive revenue from the fees they levy on the
merchant for each transaction.
16. However, the increase in these opportunities has also enabled
the growth of a substitute for the transaction demand for credit
cards—the use of debit cards. Zinman (2005) provides evidence that
households that cannot take advantage of ﬂoat because they carry a
balance on their credit cards tend to use debit cards. Klee (2004)
identiﬁes several factors that may have led to an increase in debit card
use, perhaps at the expense of credit cards.
17. The Census Bureau deﬁnes e-commerce sales as ‘‘sales of
goods and services where an order is placed by the buyer or price and
terms of sale are negotiated over an Internet, extranet, Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) network, electronic mail, or other online system.




19. Data from the Federal Reserve’s Quarterly Report of Credit
Card Interest Rates (FR 2835a), www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
reportforms/ReportDetail.cfm (under ‘‘Categories of forms’’ select
‘‘Business/consumer credit’’) and author’s calculations.
20. The revolving consumer credit portion of the FOR—the level
of monthly payments on such credit relative to disposable income—
is calculated from the level of revolving credit balances. Payments
on revolving credit balances—the numerator of the revolving credit
FOR—are assumed to be 21⁄2 percent of those balances. This assump-
tion corresponds to the average minimum required payment implied
by responses to the Federal Reserve System’s January 1999 Senior
Loan Ofﬁcer Survey on Bank Lending Practices. In that survey, loan
ofﬁcers also indicated that minimums had not changed substantially
over the previous decade. Responses to the 2003 Consumer Action
survey of banks also implied an average minimum payment of
between 2 percent and 3 percent (Consumer Action News, ‘‘Annual
Credit Card Survey 2003’’).
More recently, some lenders have changed their payment formula
so that minimum payments equal current ﬁnance charges and fees plus
some small amount of the outstanding balance (Consumer Action
News, ‘‘Annual Credit Card Survey 2005’’). This new formula could
raise or lower required payments, depending on the interest rate
and the amount of balance repaid. (For the Consumer Action News
surveys, see www.consumer-action.org/English/library/credit_cards/
index.php.)
480 Federal Reserve Bulletin Autumn 20051989 level. Using the statistical model described
above, cardholders were divided into one group that
probably acquired cards after 1989, called new card-
holders, and another group that probably had credit
cards before 1989, called existing cardholders. The
counterfactual revolving credit FOR was based on
the debt of only the latter group, and the difference
between the counterfactual and actual revolving
credit FOR represents the effect of new cardholders.
New cardholders are deﬁned as those households
with the lowest probability of holding a credit card
(see also table 2). For each triennial SCF from 1992
to 2001, enough new cardholders were removed from
the group of cardholders to reduce the share of house-
holds with cards to its 1989 value.21 The growth in
credit card debt associated with the households who
acquired cards after 1989 accounted for about 9 per-
cent of the growth in total credit card debt between
1989 and the second quarter of 2005.22
The counterfactual revolving credit FOR with the
debt of the new cardholders removed is below the
actual level (chart 4). The results imply that had
the share of households with credit cards remained at
its 1989 level, the rise in the FOR would have been
about 1⁄3 percentage point smaller than it actually
was. A general substitution toward credit cards from
other types of consumer loans and, more recently,
away from credit cards toward mortgages also
affected the amount of credit card debt, although the
effect on overall household ﬁnancial obligations is
ambiguous (see box ‘‘Substitution between Credit
Cards and Other Forms of Credit’’).
The Effect of Variable Interest Rates
The greater responsiveness of credit card interest
rates to market rates, combined with a signiﬁcant
change in market rates in the early part of this decade,
had a substantial effect on household ﬁnancial obli-
gations. The average real credit card interest rate fell
more than 3 percentage points from the fourth quarter
of 2001 to the second quarter of 2004, when it
reached its low point, about 111⁄4 percent. When
credit card interest rates fall, households demand
signiﬁcantly more credit card debt. For example,
researchers have estimated that a 1 percent decline in
interest rates on bank-issued credit cards leads to a
11⁄3 percent rise in the demand for credit card debt.23
A decline in credit card interest rates that leads to
a smaller margin over the cost of funds could also
cause lenders to reduce their supply of credit card
debt, which in turn could damp the amount of credit
card debt outstanding. However, in the short run, the
effect seems unlikely to be large because credit cards
are open-ended credit contracts that specify only a
credit limit. Most lenders are unwilling to reduce the
credit line extended to existing customers in good
standing. In a recent survey, 53 percent of banks
reported reducing cardholder credit limits but usually
only because the borrower had become riskier in
some way.24 Hence, the responsiveness of demand to
a change in rates would likely be the dominant deter-
minant of the response of revolving debt outstanding
to such a change.
To gauge the effect of changes in credit card inter-
est rates on the revolving credit FOR, a counter-
factual level of revolving credit was estimated under
the assumption that interest rates on credit cards
remained at their level in the ﬁrst quarter of 1989. In
particular, the change in real credit card debt pre-
dicted by the change in real credit card interest rates
was subtracted from the actual level of debt.
21. About 31⁄4 percent of cardholders were removed in 1992,
61⁄2 percent in 1995, 41⁄3 percent in 1998, and almost 9 percent in
2001. To extend the analysis through the second quarter of 2005, the
share of credit card debt held by new cardholders was kept constant at
its 2001 value.
22. This estimated effect is slightly smaller than that calculated by
Yoo (1997, 1998), who assumes that new cardholders have the same
amount of debt as existing holders. However, new cardholders appear
to have a bit less debt than existing holders; for example, in 2001, the
average credit card balance of a new cardholder was about $2,180,
whereas the average balance of an existing cardholder was $2,332.
23. Gross and Souleles (2002). This effect was estimated without
accounting for households switching balances between cards as inter-
est rates change. Accounting for this switching reduces the rise in
demand to about 1 percent.
24. Consumer Action News, ‘‘Annual Credit Card Survey 2005.’’
4. Effect on the revolving credit FOR of an increasing  








2005 2000 1995 1990
Revolving credit FOR
NOTE: The data are quarterly. The counterfactual data consist of the con-
sumer revolving credit FOR only for households that had a credit card in
1989. For details, see text; see also note to chart 2. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board and author’s calculations. 
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credit FOR follows the actual revolving credit FOR
fairly closely (chart 5); this tracking is not surprising
given that the real interest rate moved little over this
period. Beginning in 2001, when the real credit card
interest rate began to decline, the counterfactual
revolving credit FOR began to lag the actual. By
mid-2004, the counterfactual series was about 1⁄3 per-
centage point below the actual. This gap implies that
the decline in real credit card interest rates in the
early part of this decade accounts for a material part
of the rise in the revolving credit FOR between 1989
and the second quarter of 2005.25
The Effect of Transactions Demand
As noted above, transactions-related credit card bal-
ances as a share of measured revolving debt rose
from about 6 percent in 1992 to 11 percent in 2001.
To estimate the effect of this increase in transactions
demand on the revolving credit FOR, a counter-
factual ratio was calculated under the assumption that
the transactions demand for credit cards did not grow
as a fraction of total revolving credit after 1989. In
the second quarter of 2005, the counterfactual level
of the revolving credit FOR was a little more than
25. This analysis ignores the point that interest rates on mortgages
fell as well over this period, a development that likely induced
households to borrow more against their homes and use the proceeds
to pay down credit card debt, which is more costly. See box ‘‘Substi-
tution between Credit Cards and Other Forms of Credit’’ for further
discussion of this potential effect.
Substitution between Credit Cards and Other Forms of Credit
Over the past ﬁfteen years, households appear to have
substituted some forms of credit for others. In the early part
of this period, the rise in the share of household debt
associated with credit card loans mirrored a decline in
so-called ‘‘personal loans’’ and loans tied speciﬁcally to the
purchase of durable goods other than vehicles. Trends in
more recent years suggest that households may have been
using mortgage loans as an alternative to credit card debt.
The effect of this substitution on household ﬁnancial obliga-
tions depends on the different terms associated with the
different forms of debt.
Credit card loans have, in some respects, a signiﬁcant
advantage over personal loans (deﬁned as unsecured,
closed-end loans used to ﬁnance unspeciﬁed expenditures)
as well as over the installment loans from department stores
and ﬁnance companies that traditionally have been used to
purchase large durable goods other than vehicles. In particu-
lar, the open-ended nature of credit card loans implies a
lower ﬁxed cost of borrowing: Households may draw on
their credit card accounts to obtain needed funds (as long as
borrowing remains below a pre-set limit) as opposed to
taking out an entirely new loan.
In deciding what form of credit to use, households weigh
this cost advantage of credit cards against other traits of
alternative loan types. One important feature is the interest
rate. Because neither credit card loans nor personal loans
are backed by collateral, interest rates are relatively high on
both types of credit. All else equal, interest rates on install-
ment loans backed by nonvehicle durable goods tend to be
lower because they are secured. On balance, households
appear to ﬁnd the convenience of credit card loans to be
appealing, as the ratio of nonvehicle nonrevolving loans to
consumer loans dropped from 12 percent in 1989 to 6 per-
cent in 2001.
The substitution of credit cards for other types of con-
sumer loans may not have a large effect on the amount of
consumer debt outstanding if households are simply replac-
ing one form of credit for an equal amount of credit card
debt. However, substitution can affect households’ debt-
related ﬁnancial obligations if the terms of credit card debt
are different than the terms of the debt it replaced. For
example, at current interest rates, the minimum required
payment on a credit card loan would be 13 percent less than
the payment on a personal loan of the same size. Even
though the interest rates are similar, the credit card loan has
a payment equivalent to a personal loan with a maturity
almost one year longer than that of the typical personal
loan.
In the past couple of years, households may have been
substituting mortgage debt for credit card debt. For exam-
ple, in 2004, outstanding mortgage debt increased about
14 percent while credit card loans grew only about 4 per-
cent. Mortgage loans can be an attractive alternative to
credit card borrowing because they have lower interest
rates and because mortgage interest payments are tax
deductible. Indeed, in surveys, households report using a
signiﬁcant share of the proceeds from cash-out mortgage
reﬁnancing transactions—which involve liquidating home
equity by taking out a larger mortgage loan—to pay down
credit card loans (Canner, Dynan, and Passmore, 2002).
All told, substitution toward ﬁrst-lien mortgages tends to
lower required payments on ﬁnancial obligations because
they have lower interest rates and longer maturities. How-
ever, substitution toward mortgage debt does not always
reduce required debt payments; for example, the terms on
home equity lines of credit (generally a junior lien) are
usually similar to those on credit card debt. The transfer of
consumer debt to mortgage debt may be limited by the
higher costs of defaulting on a mortgage (which could
involve loss of the home) and the fact that only homeown-
ers have access to mortgage credit.
482 Federal Reserve Bulletin Autumn 20051⁄3 percentage point lower than the actual revolving
credit FOR (chart 6); this gap represents the cumula-
tive effect of the rise in transactions demand since
1989.
The Combined Effect of the Three Credit Card
Market Developments
A simple combination of the estimated effects of the
increase in the share of households that hold credit
cards, the fall in real credit card interest rates, and the
rise in transactions demand explains virtually all of
the net increase in the overall revolving credit FOR
since 1989 (chart 7). However, these effects may not
be entirely independent of one another; as a result,
the sum of the three effects should be considered an
upper bound. For example, a decline in the interest
rate may cause an increase in debt partly because it
may prompt households to apply for a ﬁrst credit
card; in this case, the sum of the inﬂuences captures
the interest rate effect twice. Yet, the overlap may be
limited by the fact that these effects, to some degree,
pertain to different segments of the credit card mar-
ket. For example, transactions demand has grown
mainly among upper-income households that have
held credit cards for a long time and are not sensitive
to interest rates because they pay off their credit card
balances each month.
The counterfactual revolving credit FOR rose sig-
niﬁcantly through 1997, but it has since reversed
about all of the increase. This evolution raises a
question about the determinants of revolving credit
card debt apart from the three credit card develop-
ments analyzed above. One possible determinant is
consumer conﬁdence: The counterfactual revolving
credit FOR seems to move broadly with consumer
sentiment (chart 8; the counterfactual FOR here is the
same as shown in chart 7). The co-movement hints,
perhaps, that when households become more con-
ﬁdent, holding other market developments con-
stant, they may choose to increase their revolving
debt faster than their disposable personal income
increases; conversely, when conﬁdence declines, such
revolving debt increases more slowly than does dis-
posable personal income.
5. Effect on the revolving credit FOR of a falling real  







2005 2000 1995 1990
Revolving credit
FOR
NOTE: The data are quarterly. The counterfactual data consist of the con-
sumer revolving credit FOR predicted if the average real credit card interest
rate had remained at its 1989:Q1 level. For details, see text; see also note to
chart 2. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board and author’s calculations. 
6. Effect on the revolving credit FOR of rising  







2005 2000 1995 1990
Revolving credit FOR
NOTE: The data are quarterly. The counterfactual data consist of the con-
sumer revolving credit FOR predicted if the proportion of credit card debt
arising from transactions-related use had remained at its 1989 level. For
details, see text; see also note to chart 2. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board and author’s calculations. 
7. Combined effects on the revolving credit FOR of  







2005 2000 1995 1990
Revolving credit FOR
NOTE: The data are quarterly. The counterfactual data combine the effects
of the developments shown in charts 4–6. For details, see text; see also note
to chart 2. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board and author’s calculations. 
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Three developments in the credit card market contrib-
uted to the rise in the overall household FOR during
the past ﬁfteen years. Had the share of households
with credit cards, the level of credit card interest
rates, and the transactions-related demand for credit
cards all remained at their 1989 levels, credit card
debt outstanding in 2005 would have been signiﬁ-
cantly lower. In the absence of other changes, the rise
in the total FOR over the past ﬁfteen years would
have been as much as 1 percentage point smaller than
it actually was, a reduction that would have left the
the 2005 FOR well in line with levels that existed
earlier (chart 9).
The various sources of the rise in the revolving
credit FOR have differing implications for the health
of the household sector and the broader ﬁnancial
system. For example, the part of the rise stemming
from a greater use of credit cards to pay for day-to-
day purchases will not necessarily signal greater
ﬁnancial vulnerability among households if they are
willing and able to pay off these card charges each
month. As a related matter, the growth of transactions
demand as a share of new borrowing may lessen the
exposure of credit card issuers to defaults if house-
holds are more likely to pay off transaction balances
than they are longer-term balances.
However, the implications of the rise in ﬁnancial
obligations associated with the decline in credit card
interest rates in the early part of this decade are more
complicated. A key issue would be the effect on
households as interest rates rise. An increase in inter-
est rates would likely damp demand for credit card
debt and thus lead to a partial reversal of the rise in
the revolving credit FOR. At the same time, rising
rates could make it more difﬁcult for some house-
holds to repay their existing debt.
Whether the rise in the share of households with a
credit card is a cause for concern at the aggregate
level depends on whether the beneﬁts to the macro-
economy of the expansion of credit card availability
outweigh the risks. New cardholders may be less
adept at managing their credit than existing cardhold-
ers, and ready access to credit may make them more
prone to taking on unmanageable levels of ﬁnancial
obligations. However, this ready access to credit may
also help them maintain their consumption during
temporary income disruptions, which could help
smooth macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.26
All told, an important implication of the analysis
here is that researchers should exercise caution when
comparing levels of the ﬁnancial obligations ratio
over long periods. Speciﬁcally, the factors behind an
increase in the FOR should be identiﬁed and evalu-
ated before one concludes that the increase implies
greater ﬁnancial fragility for the U.S. household sec-
tor or for the macroeconomy more broadly.
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